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 This project incorporates legal, ethical, and social analyses in an attempt to synthesize a clear 
picture of current problems with comprehension of informed consent disclosures in order to determine 
possible avenues of procedural improvement.  To that end, a series of semi-standardized interviews with 
professionals involved in informed consent proceedings were conducted.  Responses were used in 





 As the student investigator, I would like to acknowledge and thank all interview subjects for their 
incisive candor and cogent descriptions of their informed consent experiences, the WPI Institutional 
Review Board members for their helpful input on project and interview design, and most importantly, 
Dr. Kent Rissmiller for his unfailing patience, interest and wise counsel without which this project 
would never have been possible.  I would also like to thank all researchers in the area of informed 
consent for improving our collective understanding of such an important part of contemporary bioethics. 
 iii 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Ethical Foundations .................................................................................................... 3 
3. Contemporary Bioethics ........................................................................................... 17 
4. Legal Basis................................................................................................................ 20 
5. Special Issues ............................................................................................................ 25 
6. Comprehension in Informed Consent ....................................................................... 26 
7. Investigational Method ............................................................................................. 29 
8. Responses and Discussion ........................................................................................ 30 
9. Policy Recommendations & Conclusions................................................................. 32 




Decision-making processes involving competing valuable interests require 
employment of analytical systems in order to optimally resolve the conflict.  Perhaps 
nowhere is this concept more central than in the area of informed consent, one of the 
most important yet least clearly understood bioethical doctrines of the present day.  
Broadly, informed consent refers to the positive duty of those who would interfere with a 
person’s recognized rights of bodily integrity and self-determination to inform that 
individual of the possible consequences of the particular interference proposed and to 
obtain consent before proceeding.  The concept of informed consent finds applications in 
diverse areas, but most frequently, discussion of informed consent is limited to medical 
and research contexts. 
In both areas, there are three analytical systems by which one can make an 
assessment as to possible courses of action.  These three systems fall into a continuum of 
specificity, and in general the functional importance of each as regards informed consent 
is directly proportional to the degree of specificity in the system.  The least specific of 
these, ethical analysis, can be applied to any decision.  In the middle is the legal system, 
which prescribes laws and regulations that apply only to certain areas of decision making 
and indeed only to certain questions in informed consent.  While, due to the coercive 
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power of the state, law may be invested with the most power of these systems, in practice 
the law often acts in deference to the third system.  This third and most specific 
analytical system is that of clinical practice in informed consent, which refers to the 
aggregate of customs, policies, and regulations that physicians and researchers 
respectively apply in the course of their duties. 
Often, these three systems overlap and interact, sometimes in a contradictory 
fashion.  This contradiction may be counterintuitive, since at first apprehension it would 
seem that each system is derived from the previous.  However, while law is theoretically 
founded upon the common ethics adopted by a society and can thus be conceived as a 
type of intermediary between ethics and clinical practice, the vagaries and technicalities of 
law combined with barriers to its change prevent it from perfectly representing the ethical 
sensibilities of the citizenry at large. 
Clinical practice, though based heavily on the various laws binding doctors and 
scientists participating in human research,* also takes into account many of the everyday 
realities in these fields which may be too complex or may require too much expert 
knowledge for the law to consider.  While the ultimate decision in a question of informed 
consent may be determined by which system supersedes the others in a specific case, all 
                                                 
* Hereafter, terminology referring to the practitioner and beneficiary of informed consent will be frequently 
abbreviated to the medical context.  The material should be understood as also applicable to researchers and 
subjects in an experimental context. 
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three systems should always be explored in order to increase surety in achieving the best 
result. 
2. Ethical Foundations 
 
Great advances in bioethics have occurred due to the augmented public and 
scientific interest over the course of the past two decades, and one of the most notable 
trends is the increasing popularity of a consensus-based approach to ethical dilemmas.  It 
has become evident that no single ethical theory thus far devised is sufficient to analyze 
the myriad, diverse ethical dilemmas that confront today’s researchers and medical 
practitioners.  To better address these problems, the thorough bioethicist must draw from 
multiple moral traditions to build an “ethical consensus” that may serve as a more 
effective guide to the complex issues presented today. 1  This wisdom certainly applies in 
the area of informed consent, where some of the most challenging ethical issues are often 
encountered.  Endeavoring to follow Martin’s advice, the following two sections of this 
paper will approach several of the most prominent ethical influences upon the practice 
and analysis of informed consent practices. 
Though informed consent is now an international phenomenon, the focus of 
this research project is on the theory and practice of informed consent in the United 
States, and thus the Western moral derivation of informed consent is of prime interest 
 4 
here.  The roots of informed consent stretch back to the fundamental ideals upon which 
American society was formed.  Embedded in the moral traditions of the West, and 
especially those of the United States, are core principles of personal autonomy and self-
determination.  From these foundations arose the patient or subject’s right to informed 
consent, to which the doctor or researcher’s duty of informed consent is a corollary. 
The supreme masterpiece of Western theory on autonomy is the moral 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who suggested autonomy as the supreme principle in all 
moral actions.2  Kant’s moral philosophy was both original and profound in this matter, 
providing a new conception of humans as rational, self-governing moral agents.   
According to Kant, the ability to impose one’s will and act towards one’s own benefit is 
the most important factor separating human beings from animals and objects, which are 
by comparison mere tools by which humans may seek to further their goals. 3 
Kant’s autonomy has two parts: self-imposition of values, and effective self-
government in accord with these values.  Since morals are requirements that we impose 
upon ourselves, Kant argues, a person is always the final arbiter of his own morality and 
therefore the first part of Kant’s definition is always satisfied.  The moral laws that people 
thus create are obligations, and the fulfillment of these obligations is the supreme duty.  
Kant proposes that this moral duty to oneself must trump all other influences upon our 
decisions, including desires, which Kant views as entirely separate from morals.  The 
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ability of someone to correctly prioritize and act upon his self-imposed ethical guidelines 
is Kant’s depiction of virtue, which he equivocates with “moral strength of will.” 
In his notes on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract, Kant makes a specific 
argument against paternalism, no matter how benevolent.4  Above all, the independence 
of autonomous beings must be maintained; else their very nature is compromised.  Kant 
reviles the air of servility that he sees as inseparable from a situation in which humans are 
dependent upon the beneficence of others.  He further condemns systems and situations 
in which things deserved by right are granted only in submission: “It is not all one under 
what title I get something.  What properly belongs to me must not be accorded to me 
merely as something I ask for.”5 
A common objection to this Kantian theory comes from the voice of history: 
Kant’s real break with tradition in this new moral philosophy was that he asserted that 
human beings were indeed capable of self-governance through self-motivation to self-
imposed moral action.  Prior philosophy, with the notable exception of Rousseau (who 
influenced Kant deeply in this matter), held that one or more parts of this self-
governance must be delegated to an external authority in the form of the law, a god, or 
nature.6 
Kant rejected these theories, which he termed heteronomous, since they lead to 
a viewpoint in which quantifiable good, or “moral rightness,” is existent independently of 
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the only beings capable of moral judgment—humans.  Kant insists that moral necessities 
can and must be purely a priori, as good and evil are concepts which describe an action’s 
relation to the moral law.  Kant thus avoids the problem of incomplete knowledge cited 
by several naturalists and theists, in which it is claimed that humans cannot be morally 
autonomous since a given human is highly unlikely to know all of the repercussions of an 
action and what moral requirements may apply.  In acting as rational agents and applying 
our wills, we are implicitly forced to make moral decisions, as morality is part of the 
rational will.  Thus, an action can only be properly judged within the context of the 
principle it was based upon, and extent of knowledge is obviated.   
Kant concedes that humans may not always apprehend the correct moral 
principles on which to base decisions, and often will not take the path they know is right.  
However, it is the creation of the known right path, the “ought,” which is of prime 
importance to Kant’s theory—if we know what we should do and do not do it, we are still 
capable of ruling ourselves through autonomous will, but are merely imperfect.  Kant 
ennobles this human imperfection in the concept of virtue, as previously mentioned.  The 
struggle for moral rectitude is the proper station of humans in Kant’s eyes, and this very 
battle of our moral and rational wills against our base impulses and desires is what makes 
our moral decisions meaningful; a perfectly good being would not need to exert any effort 
to act on morals over impulses, and so those actions would not deserve the same praise. 
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Kant also elaborates on the process of moral decisions and gives a guide to 
action which, in addition to instructing the reader in how to act morally, further 
elucidates the Kantian perspective on the framework of moral action.  In his syntheses of 
morality, Kant invented several concepts which have become cornerstones of Western 
moral philosophy: maxims, the hypothetical imperative, and the categorical imperative. 
Recalling Plato and other ancient philosophers, Kant insists that moral laws 
must be classically formal.  Classical formality implies a differentiation between form and 
matter; form is a sort of universal organization that gives objects and ideas their essential 
character while matter is the “filler” or detail.  In the context of Kantian morality, that 
distinction leads one naturally to Kant’s own concept of maxims, which are essentially 
purely formal, generalized moral prescriptions.  It is through maxims, Kant argues, that 
we can both understand morality and act morally, even though the intellect (or will) will 
need to adapt these maxims to individual situations as necessary.  Kant’s maxims are 
generally conditionally willed future actions, e.g. “If it is cold out, I shall put on a jacket.”  
The particular jacket, temperature, or any other details are not important or relevant to 
the maxim, and through that very absence of detail maxims become easily morally 
evaluable. 
Kant’s two imperatives are what he considers the two basic laws of rational will.  
He deems it evident that a rational will working towards an end must take action towards 
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that end, and Kant’s hypothetical imperative states little more than that: “Whoever wills 
an end ought to will the means.”  This statement is conditional, as the imperative 
(“ought”) portion depends upon the willing of the end, and thus it earns its title as 
hypothetical.  Kant’s categorical imperative, perhaps his most often-cited philosophical 
doctrine, can be construed as the “conscience” of the rational will, and creates a necessary 
inclusion of morality into all actions of a rational will. 
The basic form of the categorical imperative, which Kant outlined in his 
Groundwork on the Metaphysic of Morals, is “Act only according to that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”7  This is 
Kant’s ultimate statement on morality and his definition of lawfulness itself, and Kant 
views it as obviously necessary in a society in which there are many agents of rational will.  
This imperative creates two requirements in the analysis of the maxim underlying a 
potential action, as Kant later describes: one must both be able to conceive of a world in 
which this maxim is universal law (alternately, a “law of nature”) and rationally will its 
existence.  If it is not possible to do both, then the potential maxim fails the moral test 
and must be discarded as immoral. 
J. B. Schneewind, in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, proposes testing a 
maxim first by the hypothetical imperative, and then the categorical imperative, as a 
maxim must meet both criteria to be acceptably rational and moral.8  This is intuitive; 
 9 
one must essentially decide whether an action is moving oneself towards the achievement 
of a goal, and then whether the underlying principle of the action is universalizable and 
therefore right and lawful.  This is a convenient and practical way to quickly discard some 
actions with an easier test in the hypothetical imperative, but a proper understanding of 
the categorical imperative would necessarily imply the hypothetical imperative, as one 
could not rationally will a world in which all beings acted irrationally. 
 The categorical imperative’s logic is further clarified through extension to Kant’s 
concept of right, “the totality of conditions under which the will of one person can be 
unified with the will of another under a universal law of freedom.”9  Kant also described 
how this concept should be applied in testing maxims or actions: “Every action is right 
which, or the maxim of which, allows the freedom of the will of each to subsist together 
with the freedom of everyone.”10  This addition completes the rudiments of Kant’s logical 
moral system, and one may understand how each part of the system, which is derived 
from pure rationality, depends on each other part.  Fundamental to all parts of his moral 
philosophy is the overriding perception of human beings as moral agents acting according 
to rational wills. It is clear that any morality compatible with Kant’s would need to 
respect this autonomy as without that autonomy, there could be no moral judgment, and 
no right; we would be cast adrift in a sea of amorality. 
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Kant’s influential philosophy has a multitude of implications towards informed 
consent.  In order to respect the autonomy of persons, we must trust in their rational wills 
and allow them to make their own decisions, so long as that decision will not interfere 
with the freedom of others.  In the case of a medical decision or the decision to 
participate in scientific research involving human subjects, an individual’s choice 
regarding participation will not impact the freedom of others and therefore must be 
preserved.  If it is not, the individual is stripped of his moral and rational agency, which 
in turn deprives that individual of all freedom and dignity. 
A decision made under undue pressure, of course, would not be autonomous as 
it does not embody the unfettered will of the decision maker, instead it would create a 
heteronomous dependency on an external source of decision.  A medical decision made 
wholly by a doctor on behalf of a patient would be yet worse; the physician in that case 
would, by ignoring the patient’s will, be treating the patient as an inanimate object for the 
purpose of fulfilling the doctor’s goals.  Despite the fact that the patient’s and the doctor’s 
primary objectives are presumably both the patient’s well-being, it is the patient’s 
subjective view of his benefit that is of importance to the concept of autonomy and thus is 
a basis for moral action.11  As discussed in the next section, this beneficent 
instrumentalization, known as medical paternalism, was standard practice for the majority 
of medical history. 
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Noted English moralist John Rawls disagreed with Kant on several points, 
though in the end the implications of Rawlsian moral theory for informed consent are 
similar to those of Kantian theory.  While Rawls was not read, nor even alive, at the time 
of the founding of the United States, he followed in the same liberal tradition of the 
philosophers who influenced the founders of the USA.  Rawls had a great advantage, 
however, in terms of the amount of prior thought readily available to him.  As a result, 
Rawls had the ability to compare and contrast a great deal of others’ moral philosophy in 
the synthesis of his own.  The works that Rawls thus created have now become 
cornerstone of modern liberal political philosophy. 
In his aptly-named, quintessential work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls focuses on 
the principle of justice as a foundation for moral philosophy.  In doing so, he takes a 
fundamentally different approach to Kant: instead of focusing on an individual code of 
ethics and then deriving societal implications from these personal morals, Rawls jumps 
straightaway to a national viewpoint.  To determine these societal principles, Rawls 
applies a theory which amounts to a reformulation of Kant’s categorical imperative for 
better application to policymakers.  Rawls advocates discussing what is right for a country 
to do under a “veil of ignorance,” in which one must make decisions blind to one’s own 
position in a hypothetical society.12 
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Relying on the principle of rational minds making self-interested decisions, 
Rawls reasons that if one were making rules for a society without knowledge of one’s 
place in this society, one would not wish to make unfair rules, lest one risk falling victim 
by chance to a disadvantaged position.  Rather than leaving it up to one’s own conscience 
to decide whether an action is truly representative of a universal maxim, Rawls chooses to 
use this “ignorant” viewpoint, called the “original position,” in order to ensure easily 
recognized universality.13 
Indeed, Rawls himself seems to view his postulated perspective and the famed 
principles of justice that he subsequently derives as deepening and extending Kant’s 
theory.  Remarking that the original position may be conceived as a procedural 
interpretation of Kant’s model of autonomy, Rawls writes that the principles which 
would derive from his original position are the same as those that would regulate a 
kingdom of ends (Kant’s term for a society in which each member acted according to the 
Categorical Imperative.)14 
Utilitarianism, another eminent school of ethical theory in the Western 
tradition, differs greatly from Kantian ethics in its moral perspective.  Invented by 
English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarianism dictates that the best action is the 
one which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.  
This moral rule is known as the greatest happiness principle and is considered to be the 
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foundation of Utilitarianism.  As with any ethical analysis system, detractors pose a 
number of challenges to Utilitarian theory, chief among which is that great harm might 
be done to a few for the sake of obtaining a small amount of good for the masses. 
Extending and crystallizing Bentham’s theories, John Stuart Mill popularized 
the doctrine further in works including On Liberty and Utilitarianism.  In these essays, 
Mill recalls Aristotle in arguing that there are different types of freedom and happiness, 
and in his indication that a given amount of superior happiness may trump a greater 
amount of lesser happiness.  Echoing the Declaration of Independence, Mill suggests 
that all men must be free to pursue happiness in their own ways.  This respect for 
autonomy as personal freedom was Mill’s counter to criticisms of Bentham’s work as 
being subject to mob rule and to schadenfreude, the taking of pleasure at another’s 
misfortune. 
Without Mill’s supplement, Utilitarian theory might justify practices such as 
ancient Roman gladiatorial games: since the pleasure derived by many spectators at such a 
game might be greater than the amount of suffering that the gladiators undergo, 
especially since part of the excitement (which, for the sake of argument, can be assumed 
to be the source of pleasure in the context of gladiatorial combat) for the crowd is 
dependant upon the struggle and fear of the combatant.  With the addition of respect for 
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autonomy, the whims of the crowd would be inferior in moral stature to the personal 
liberty of the gladiator. 
In On Liberty, Mill strictly stated this “liberty principle” of societal respect for 
individual autonomy: “…the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”  
It is thus evident that despite the fairly large differences between the moral theories of 
Mill and Kant, they would reach the same conclusion: in the contexts in which informed 
consent is discussed, individual autonomy must be held in the highest regard and must 
not be violated except in exceptional cases.   Mill clearly agrees: 
 
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in 
our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede 
their efforts to obtain it.  Each is the proper guardian of his own health, 
whether bodily or mental and spiritual.  Mankind are greater gainers by 
suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling 




These various ethical perspectives that have been discussed do not stand alone 
as abstract philosophies; to the contrary, they reflect and have influenced the progression 
of liberal ideals in the Western world.  Perhaps no country exhibits this trend more than 
the United States, as exemplified in both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. 
Constitution.  However, a far older British document, the Magna Carta, was a harbinger 
for the evolving respect for autonomy present in diverse Western moralities. 
The Magna Carta, issued initially in 1215, set a new standard for protection of 
individuals from government in creating the right of habeus corpus.  Although a specific 
procedure was not codified until the Habeus Corpus Act of 1679, the Magna Carta 
declared the right by stating that the sovereign had the right to determine why the 
“liberty of any of his subjects was restricted.”  After the Habeus Corpus Act was passed, 
the original intention of the statement—to protect citizens from wrongful detainment—
was implemented by allowing prisoners to submit a petition to the Court, which would 
hold proceedings to determine the lawfulness of the petitioner’s imprisonment. 
This guiding principle of the Magna Carta was clearly on the minds of United 
States founders when the Declaration of Independence was issued.  Too familiar with the 
injustices and abuses that arise when a government possesses tyrannical authority over its 
citizens, they boldly declared that all men are created equal and are endowed with 
unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  Further, they declared 
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that it is the right of individuals to structure a government in whatever way seems, to 
them, most capable of guaranteeing their safety and happiness. 
This definitive adoption of autonomy as a chief principle of United States 
society was later incorporated into the United States Constitution, which includes the 
right of habeas corpus in the Suspension Clause, located in the first section of the 
Constitution.  Perhaps of greater import, though, is the right to due process codified in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution: “…nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”  Despite the wording 
“any state,” subsequent judicial interpretation has held the text of this Amendment to 
apply more universally to all levels of government. 
By specifically recognizing individual liberty—one formulation of autonomy—
as inviolable except when a formal legal proceeding based upon the laws of a 
representative democracy has removed that liberty, this Due Process Clause serves as the 
foundation for a great deal of the personal protections that United States citizens enjoy 
today.  Frequently cited in discussions of the legal foundations of the rights to informed 
consent and personal privacy, the essential character of this passage is the protection of 
personal autonomy.  This inclusion of enforced protection of the autonomous freedom of 
individuals in the very bedrock of United States jurisprudence leaves no doubt: the 
Constitution and the ethical philosophy which it was based upon demand that everyone, 
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due to conscience of the principles of the foundation of the United States and due also to 
legal obligation, must respect the autonomy of persons in informed consent proceedings.   
  
3. Contemporary Bioethics 
 
In their seminal text Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress 
offer a broad picture of the field of bioethics, including informed consent practices.  In 
their noteworthy ethical analysis of the relevant issues, they propose a new ethical 
perspective specific to dealing with these issues.  Their viewpoint, dubbed principlism, 
puts forth four basic principles as central tenets of bioethical analyses upon which relevant 
dilemmas may be judged.  Despite the fact that this is no longer considered a wholly 
adequate approach to bioethical problems, the value of these principles is beyond 
question.  Two of these principles are autonomy and justice, which have been often 
explored by classical ethical theorists such as Kant and Rawls.  The other two principles, 
nonmaleficence and beneficence, are more application-specific normative cornerstones of 
medical morality originating from Hippocratic tradition and continuing through to the 
present day. 
The conception behind these two principles can indeed be gleaned from 
Hippocrates himself in his Epidemics: “The physician must…have two special objects in 
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view with regard to disease, namely, to do good or to do no harm.”16  Respectively, these 
two “special objects” constitute the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence.  
Despite their seeming similarity, these two goals are distinct principles which may 
sometimes even conflict.17 
Beneficence, the raison d’être of physicians, is an affirmation of the purpose of 
their profession—to help.  The doctor does good when he cures, enhances the quality of 
life for, or otherwise treats a patient.  In order to do the most good, then, the doctor must 
use his training to choose the most effective medical treatment.  If a patient might elect 
to choose another option, then that would compromise the completion of the physician’s 
objective of beneficence.  This conflict leads to a phenomenon known as medical 
paternalism, in which medical practitioners assume the totality of the decision-making 
process on the assumption that their training will allow them to make the best judgment 
and thus produce the most good. 
Medical paternalism, however, fails to take into account many factors, including 
respect for individual autonomy, personal beliefs, and the patient’s assumption of risk.  
Further, the credibility of medical paternalism has been tarnished by atrocities such as 
Nazi medical “experimentation” at Nuremburg and the Tuskegee syphilis study.  
Increasing public awareness and skepticism of pharmaceutical corporate interest and 
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involvement in biomedical research has also contributed to a lack of trust in the 
biomedical establishment.18 
The other duty that Hippocrates places upon physicians, that of 
nonmaleficence, is more subtle but also more applicable to a present-day informed 
consent discussion.  The prominence of respect for autonomy and related rights, 
including those of privacy and self-possession, in modern ethical discourse impels 
biomedical ethicists to consider a violation of those rights to be a form of harm.  As a 
result, allowing medical paternalism to trample these rights is a violation of the duty of 
nonmaleficence, which is regarded as being a duty of greater priority than that of 
beneficence. 
Despite the historical constancy of medical paternalism, it is crucial for ethical 
practice of medicine in the United States to consider these mores which are so 
entrenched in American culture.  However, autonomy is not to be construed as the sole 
factor which should influence medical decision-making, including informed consent 
procedures.  Rising trends of medical consumerism threaten their own harms, including 
forcing patients to make decisions that they do not wish to or cannot handle and 
devaluing the expertise of medical practitioners. 
There are certain situations in which complete, direct autonomy does not serve 
towards the benefit of the patient or, indeed, the patient’s wishes.  The obvious 
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exceptional case is that of the incompetent patient, incapable either of making any 
decision or at least of making a rational one.  The topic of incompetence will be covered 
in greater detail in a later section.  A less severe case in which total autonomy is not 
desirable is when the patient does not wish to make his own medical decisions.  One of 
the most important roles of a doctor is to counsel patients in medical matters, and 
patients may often feel unable to make decisions due to their illness, or may simply feel 
that reliance upon a doctor’s expert judgment is in their best interest.  Even in these 
cases, the patient’s autonomy is preserved in the form of the delegation of authority for 
actual decision-making to the doctor.  The origin of the authorization of treatment 
remains the patient’s will, which entrusts the care of that patient to the physician to 
whom the patient has delegated decision-making authority. 
 
4. Legal Basis 
 
To some degree, medical consent (although not specifically informed consent) 
has always been required under common law due to the principle of battery.  One early 
case involving this legal precept is Slater v. Baker and Stapleton (1767), an English case in 
which a surgeon was found liable for not obtaining his patient’s consent before breaking 
one of the patient’s bones in order to reset a partially healed fracture.  However, in 
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keeping with their tradition of medical paternalism, doctors often misrepresented 
treatment in order to obtain the patient’s consent which might have been withheld had 
the patient been told the truth.  During the beginning of the twentieth century, this 
practice was abolished when rules were enacted around the country requiring any 
information that a physician provides to his patient to be truthful.    Physicians still did 
not have a positive duty to disclose information, however. 
A transition from this simple form of consent to informed consent began in 
1914 with Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital.  In this case, the Court held that 
consent must be given freely, recognizing the principle of autonomy.  Salgo v. Leland 
Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees (1957) was a Californian case in which the 
decision created the first requirement of informed consent while coining the very term.  
Salgo was a patient who suffered permanent paralysis as the result of a diagnostic test and 
then filed suit against his doctor, alleging that his doctor had provided him with 
inadequate information regarding the procedure. 
Legal requirements of informed consent were further shaped by subsequent 
cases in various state courts across the country, notably in Mitchell v. Robinson and 
Natanson v. Kline, both 1960 cases.  Both cases involved patients who suffered major 
negative health consequences pursuant to prescribed medical treatments.  In Mitchell, the 
court held that it was a physician’s duty to inform the patient of possible negative 
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outcomes of treatment.  The Natanson decision went further, with the court stating that 
doctors must inform patients not only of possible negative consequences, but also of the 
goals of treatment, chances of success, and alternatives to the recommended course of 
treatment.  These criteria laid out in Natanson have stood the test of time and are the 
core elements of disclosure required for informed consent today. 
Still, as with almost any legal issue where the majority of the law is crafted by 
the states as opposed to the federal government, there are substantial differences in the 
requirements of informed consent across the country.  One particularly notable difference 
in standards of disclosure arises from a disparity in the perspective from which the courts 
evaluate the information presented.  Approximately half of U.S. states follow a 
professional standard of disclosure, meaning that a physician must communicate such 
information as would be considered professionally appropriate or customary by other 
doctors.  This doctrine has been implemented to some degree throughout history; in the 
1767 Slater v. Baker case mentioned earlier, the court’s rationale was indeed based on the 
fact that other surgeons considered it fitting to inform patients of the procedure they 
were about to undergo. 
A professional standard has some clear limitations.  First, other doctors may not 
want to receive or disclose all of the same information that a patient would need or desire.  
This inclination is likely to give too much power to the practice of “therapeutic privilege,” 
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a paternalistic idea of exception to informed consent in cases where the physician deems 
that disclosure of information would work at cross purposes to the treatment.  Second, in 
cases in which there is no established practice or custom of disclosure, a professional 
standard would seem to exonerate physicians from any duty of disclosure at all.  Finally, 
in order to actually seek compensation for a failure of disclosure under a professional 
standard, would-be plaintiffs need to secure the testimony of another doctor against the 
doctor that they allege violated their right of informed consent.  Physicians are frequently 
reluctant to testify against their own.  Often, the expert witness would need not only to 
be a doctor, but specifically to be a doctor familiar with the same locality in which the 
case took place, placing a further barrier in front of patients seeking legal remedy. 
In response to these challenges, some courts decided over the course of the 
1970s that the more appropriate perspective from which to judge the information 
disclosed is that of the patient, creating what is known as a lay standard of disclosure.  
Utilization of juries to determine whether a physician has conferred the information that 
a patient would want to know imposes a greater requirement of disclosure upon the 
physician, hopefully further protecting the patient and the patient’s autonomy.  Too, this 
increased obligation does not impose an undue burden on doctors: education, training, 
and professional circumstances all make it fairly easy for physicians to ascertain what 
information patients would require in a given situation. 
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However, a lay standard also has significant drawbacks.  One such drawback is 
the possibility of what Berg, et al., refer to as “hindsight abuse.”  In a case that has not 
been previously tested in a court of law, the jury has considerable freedom to impose a 
broad range of requirements of disclosure upon the physician.  In some cases, the 
elements of the disclosure may seem obvious in the aftermath (of course, all such judicial 
questions are decided post facto, in the context of a malpractice suit, rather than as 
prescriptive law) while it may not have seemed necessary beforehand, such as in the case 
of an infinitesimal risk of severe side effects from a treatment. 
Another drawback is that such general standards are based upon “reasonable 
person” logic, and may not take into account the specific information that a particular 
patient would find relevant that might not be of interest to the average patient.  For 
example, a dancer advised to have surgery to remove a benign mass on her brain might be 
particularly fearful of a risk of decreased balance and coordination following the 
procedure, whereas an average patient could be significantly more concerned with the 
health risks of the mass itself.  A few states have attempted to correct for these drawbacks 
in lay standards of disclosure by implementing hybrid or subjective standards of 





5. Special Issues 
 
It is apparent by its very name that informed consent is a bidimensional 
requirement.  In order to determine that patients or subjects have given informed 
consent, it must be established that they have been adequately informed and also that 
they have, of their own free will, given consent.  In order to verify the degree to which 
patients are informed, standards of disclosure have been implemented which prescribe the 
types of information which physicians must pass on to their patients.   
Commonly, relevant court decisions, statutes, and regulations call for disclosure 
elements including the nature of the procedure, risks of the procedure (including the 
nature, gravity, chance, and immediacy of the risk), alternatives to the treatment, and 
sometimes the benefits of the treatment.  The requirements of consent are fewer; a 
practitioner need only make sure that the patient understands the information he has 
been given and that the patient makes a free choice to undergo the treatment. 
Despite their face-value simplicity as compared to the requirements of 
disclosure, the elements of consent have spurred far more controversial cases and issues 
due in large part to the clinical occurrences of emergent exceptions to informed consent 
as well as patient incompetence.  Doctors are generally permitted to render urgent care on 
a relatively short-term basis in an emergency situation without first obtaining consent, 
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due to the immediate health risks involved.  Patient incompetence is a related exception 
to the laws of informed consent in which an individual, due to any number of factors, is 
legally deemed to be unable to participate rationally and meaningfully in his medical care. 
  
  
6. Comprehension in Informed Consent 
 
Given the ethical basis of informed consent procedure, a patient’s 
comprehension of the information relevant to making the decisions at hand is a sine qua 
non for meaningful choice.  If a patient does not understand the disclosure he is presented 
with, then his autonomy is only negligibly more protected than if he was not offered any 
information to begin with. 
Questions have been raised as to whether any success in meeting a standard of 
comprehension might be realized.  Disclosure forms are often riddled with both legal and 
medical jargon, and those reading these forms are often untrained in these matters.  
Sickness, anxiety, and pressure often further burden a patient’s ability to internalize the 
facts at hand, both on an intellectual basis and in terms of grasping personal relevance 
and impact. 
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Comprehension of informed consent has more pragmatic necessity, as well.  
The perception of ignorance can lead to a feeling of helplessness, especially when an 
individual is undergoing a medical treatment, whether experimental or therapeutic in 
nature.   Disclosure aimed primarily at fostering comprehension and therefore 
empowerment in the patient will aid in creating a relationship of trust between the 
practitioner and the patient, which in turn will benefit both parties.  Indirectly, this 
relationship of trust may reduce the risk of litigation to the practitioner. 
Ironically, many informed consent disclosures today seem to be aimed at 
minimizing risk to litigation through contract theory.20   Even if this legal theory is 
successful in the courtroom, the practitioner and his sponsoring institution, if any, would 
still be subject to financial and time expenses associated with the legal proceedings.  
Furthermore, a patient’s signature to a questionably comprehensible form would be far 
from a bulletproof defense, especially in the context of a jury trial for medical malpractice. 
For the above reasons, it can be stated that comprehension of informed consent 
disclosures will lead to pareto-optimal outcomes and should thus be the primary target of 
any biomedical disclosure practices.  To marginalize this confluence of ethical and 
practical impetuses towards comprehension is to jeopardize the welfare of not only an 
individual patient or subject, but also the medical institution or research project.  A lack 
of public trust in biomedical establishments also has the potential to cause negative media 
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publicity, to degrade the standard of healthcare, to increase mental anguish in the sick, 
and to slow biomedical research through restrictive legislation, increased scrutiny, and 
decreased participatory willingness. 
Despite these compelling interests in comprehension of informed consent 
disclosure, evaluative studies have found great deficits in patient understanding and 
retention of information related to treatments for which the patient has given consent.  
As summarized and referenced in a recent article21 for Patient Safety and Quality 
Healthcare, the research is quite conclusive of these deficits.  Eighteen to forty-five 
percent of patients are unable to recall major risks of surgeries they will undergo,22,23,24 
many patients cannot answer even basic questions regarding their treatment,25,26 and 
many patients do not even read the informed consent disclosure form with which they are 
presented.27 
Such figures are discouraging in light of the large amounts of effort and money 
expended by practitioners involved in the administration of informed consent disclosures.  
While the ideas of informed consent and shared medical decision-making are very new 
relative to the ancient practice of medicine and its historical viewpoint of beneficent 
paternalism, the progress of these liberalized practices does not seem commensurate with 
the accelerated development of progressive societal and ethical ideals and of scientific 
progress that has occurred in the past few decades.  Research in this area, especially in the 
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area of comprehension, is essential to determine what is retarding more ubiquitous 
implementation of true shared medical decision-making. 
  
7. Investigational Method 
 A number of investigational strategies were employed for this project, which was 
conceived as an interdisciplinary overview of the status of informed consent 
comprehension and an inquiry from which some meaningful suggestions or at least clarity 
might be drawn.  The goals of this project necessitated a combination of both 
retrospective and original research. 
 The ethical analysis above was drawn from both primary texts and secondary 
sources, with a consideration of the interplay between Western moral philosophy and 
shifting societal norms.  Legal research was undertaken through news, law journal, law 
review, and court opinion sources, utilizing research tools available at WPI and also at the 
Worcester County Law Library.  Information relating to the specific topic of 
comprehension of informed consent was drawn from a number of medical journal articles 
and peer-reviewed studies. 
 For the original research component, this project involved a series of anonymous, 
semi-standardized interviews conducted with medical professionals and members of 
institutional review boards.  These interviews were aimed not to glean statistically 
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supported quantitative information, but rather to uncover the perspectives and personal 
experiences of individuals most closely involved in performing informed consent 
disclosures.  The hope of this project is that the qualitative information obtained in these 
interviews might provide valuable insight towards new or little-known strategies to 
improve comprehension in the informed consent disclosure process.   
 
8. Responses and Discussion 
 
The primary finding in the interviews conducted for this report was that despite 
greatly varying perspectives among various personnel conducting informed consent 
disclosures, all respondents were in consensus on a few key problem areas impeding 
comprehension in informed consent procedures: inadequate public medical literacy and 
health-related education, language barriers, and monolithic, impenetrable disclosure 
forms. 
Another recurrent theme in the responses to interview questions was the 
highlighted importance of an individually tailored disclosure based upon a personal 
relationship with the patient.  Both a medical practitioner in the field of obstetrics and a 
sociologist with a significant background in informed consent scholarship expressed views 
that no matter how clearly worded an informed consent disclosure document might be, 
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such a one-size-fits-all approach would never suffice to adequately empower an individual 
to make reasoned medical decisions. 
Two respondents involved in psychosocial research felt that informed consent 
regulations for human subjects research could be overly restrictive to relatively innocuous 
studies.  Both of these respondents also cited famous experiments on obedience 
conducted by Dr. Stanley Milgram in which subjects were deceived into thinking they 
were giving electric shocks to another volunteer to test the relationship between learning 
and punishment.28 
In reality, the other volunteer was an actor, and the experiment was designed to 
test the subject’s obedience when commanded to inflict pain on another.  Though 
Milgram alleged that “procedures were undertaken to assure that the subject would leave 
the laboratory in a state of well being”29 and that “an effort was made to reduce any 
tensions that arose as a result of the experiment,”30 his own study records subject reactions 
including extreme anxiety, fear, and “striking reactions of tension and emotional strain.”31  
Milgram wrote of one observer’s notes regarding an initially smiling and confident 
businessman being “reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was rapidly 
approaching a point of nervous collapse.”32  Specifically noting “tension [that] reached 
extremes that are rarely seen in sociopsychological laboratory studies,” Milgram writes of 
subjects sweating, trembling, stuttering, groaning, and having fits of uncontrollable 
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nervous laughter.  Three subjects in this experiment were under such strain that they 
collapsed in uncontrollable seizures. 
To justify such an experiment might be possible under teleological utilitarian 
ethical theory, but it is clear that it would fail a test of ethical consensus, owing to its 
disregard for autonomy and the well-being of human subjects involved.  Recent insight 
into post-traumatic stress disorder that was not available when Milgram was conducting 
this experiment further underlines the point that no matter how great the scientific 
benefit that Milgram’s study may have conferred, it came at an unconscionable risk to the 
rights and health of those subjects involved.  Perhaps the real lesson to draw from the 
Milgram experiments is that researchers must not discount seemingly intangible harms to 
subjects, for they may have ethically unjustifiable consequences not immediately obvious 
to the researcher. 
 
 
9. Policy Recommendations & Conclusions 
 
Reform in law and policy may be an avenue to partial remediation of some of 
these issues plaguing comprehension in informed consent.  In the interviews conducted 
for this project, the most frequently cited obstacle to comprehension was a perceived lack 
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of public background medical knowledge.  Examples given of this type of background 
knowledge included basic understandings of anatomy and physiology, common illnesses 
and types of treatments, and good health practices. 
An Institute of Medicine study33 has called the type of knowledge “health 
literacy,” though that term is also used in other literature to mean more basic background 
skills (reading, arithmetic, etc.) necessary as a foundation to this type of understanding.34  
The IOM study cites a wealth of research showing deficiencies in public health literacy 
and connecting failures of communication and comprehension in medical contexts to 
adverse outcomes of treatment.  This agrees with the perspectives of interviewees, and 
this information makes a compelling case for increased efforts to educate the public in 
this area.  Enhanced health education in public schools and greater implementation of 
public health awareness programs may be able to combat this lack of health literacy. 
In order to tackle comprehension problems related to language barriers, the only 
clear solution pathway is widespread dissemination of convenient and speedy medical 
translation services.  Significant research would be needed towards finding an effective 
and unobtrusive way to implement these services so that they would be available not only 
to patients in hospitals, but also to patients in private medicine and prospective research 
subjects. 
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The final problem universally recognized in the interviews was that of dense 
informed consent disclosure forms which include large amounts of information often not 
relevant to a particular patient’s decision.  This excess of information is included more to 
guard against legal liability for the medical practitioner rather than to truly inform the 
patient.  Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that any legal recourse will have the necessary 
effect of shifting disclosure practices from goals of legal risk management to goals of 
communication, comprehension, and shared decision-making.   
Further state adoption of patient-based disclosure standards, combined with 
guidelines from medical associations stressing personalized disclosure and open 
communication between physicians and patients might be able to ameliorate some degree 
of the disclosure form issues.  However, as one researcher interviewed pointed out, it 
comes down to as much a question of cultural practice as anything else.  Constant fear of 
legal liability combined with a still-present attitude of medical paternalism leads to 
unproductive, impersonal disclosures that are not likely to produce satisfactory 
comprehension in the patient.  Further research must be undertaken in this area to solve 





 10.1 Appendix A: Questionnaire 
 
 The below questions are substantially similar to those posed to each subject 
interviewed in connection with this study.  Due to the anonymous nature of the study 
along with the details involved in this study, it is impossible to disclose raw transcribed 
responses to these questions.  Note that since the interviews were conducted with semi-
standardized technique, questions were added, modified, or omitted as appropriate with 
each individual interview.  As stated in the above method section, the goal of each 
interview was not to obtain a quantitative set of responses to standard questions, but 
rather to ask questions that seemed most likely to prompt interviewees to relate wisdom 
and insights that they had acquired in the course of their duties. 
 
SECTION I: ALL INTERVIEWEES 
1. To communicate information to your (patients/subjects) necessary to obtain their 
informed consent, do you use a standardized form, a verbal explanation, a combination of 
the two, or some other technique? 
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2. What are the key elements that you describe to (patients/subjects) about a given 
treatment, procedure, or study?  Are there any additional factors that you might disclose 
only under certain circumstances? 
 
3. What percentage of your (patients/subjects) would you estimate fully understand 
the applicable information after your normal disclosure?  Do you ever take special 
measures to ensure comprehension if you do not believe the normal disclosure procedure 
has been effective? 
 
4. What are the major factors preventing comprehension of risks, benefits, etc. in 
the remainder of your (patients/subjects)?  Could anything be done to eliminate some of 
these factors? 
 
5. Are there any current problems with the system of informed consent and 
disclosure as you participate in it?  What steps could be taken to address these problems? 
 
6. How frequently, in your experience, does a dispute arise with a patient, a subject 
or the family of a patient or subject with regards to the practice of informed consent? 
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7. Have the legal requirements of informed consent ever impeded you in obtaining 
the optimum health for your patients or optimum data for your research? 
 
8. From what sources do you receive input, guidelines, forms, or other information 
or documentation relating to informed consent procedures?  Could this be better handled 
by another entity such as a professional organization? 
 
SECTION II: MEDICAL/CLINICAL INTERVIEWEES 
 
9. Do you view informed consent more as a giving of permission by the patient for 
the pre-selected treatment that you suggest, or as a shared decision-making process in 
which you and the patient together decide on a treatment option? 
 
10. Does the current practice of informed consent provide for too much or too little 
patient autonomy?  Is it more important for patients to more trustingly accept 
professional medical counsel, or for doctors to be more respectful of patient autonomy? 
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11. How have you dealt with your ethical and legal obligations to informed consent 
and disclosure in cases where a patient is temporarily or permanently incompetent to 
comprehend your disclosure or to give consent? 
 
SECTION III: REVIEW BOARD / RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES 
 
12. Do you feel that the aims and methods of research frequently conflict with the 
personal best interest of research subjects?  If so, what are the most significant points of 
conflict? 
 
13. Do current procedures for informed consent provide for pareto-optimality in 
research contexts (optimizing the combined benefit to both the researcher and the 
subject)?  If not, which side has a disproportionate amount of power in the research 
relationship and in what manner is this exhibited? 
 
14. What procedures do you undertake in cases where incomplete disclosure is 
essential to the scientific integrity of a research project?  How might we better protect 
those subjects without seriously impeding human subjects research? 
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15. The bioethics of informed consent in human research can be very complex and 
conflicting.  Do you feel that, in certain circumstances, potential for societal or scientific 
benefit from research can outweigh the value of respecting a subject’s autonomy?  Under 
what circumstances might this be the case, and what degree of deception or undisclosed 
risk might be permissible? 
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